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We argue that “friction” is not always a flaw and can be a deliberate shield against bad collective decisions. We use Buchanan and Tullock’s public choice framework to show why supermajorities, veto points, and other transaction costs can protect rights while still leaving room for day to day governing.
• contrasting cheap outrage with intentional institutional friction
• explaining why constitutional amendment rules use supermajorities
• breaking down external costs versus decision-making costs
• applying the framework to routine policy versus foundational rules
• linking cancel culture to collapsed coordination costs and lost buffers
• spotting designed friction in bicameralism, vetoes, jury unanimity, central bank independence, corporate charters, and treaties
• testing objections about minority rule, the filibuster, and who classifies “big” decisions
• discussing ballot initiatives, referenda, and easy-to-amend constitutions
• sharing listener letters, egg market notes, and a book recommendation
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You can follow Mike Munger on Twitter at @mungowitz