Devpolicy Talks

Navigating China and the Global South: a conversation with Eric Olander

Eric Olander, Editor-in-Chief of the China Global South Project, offers a nuanced perspective on China’s engagement with developing countries across Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Pacific. Drawing on 40 years of experience as a journalist covering China, including stints at the BBC, Associated Press and CNN, Olander challenges dominant Western narratives about Chinese development finance, including the much-discussed “debt trap” thesis. He examines the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative toward “small yet beautiful” projects, explores how developing countries are exercising agency in navigating great power competition, and discusses China’s construction of a parallel international governance architecture. In a frank assessment of China’s presence in the Pacific Islands, Olander argues that Australian anxieties about military threats are disproportionate to actual Chinese capabilities, while suggesting pathways for more constructive engagement between Western donors and China in development cooperation.The conversation begins with Olander’s journey to covering China, having started studying Chinese in 1985 as a teenager in California when China was still poorer than most African countries. His career progressed through internships at radio stations in Taiwan and Hong Kong to positions at the BBC, Associated Press in Beijing, and CNN. It was during travels to Africa from the mid-2000s that he witnessed the explosive growth of Chinese presence — from one Chinese restaurant in Kinshasa in 2005 to a boom of construction crews, Huawei signs and Chinese enterprises by 2009. When he asked his Congolese employees what they thought of China, their nuanced, complex answers contrasted sharply with the polarised narratives in Western and Chinese media, sparking the insight that would eventually become the China Global South Project.The China Global South Project, which evolved from the China Africa Project, operates as an independent, non-partisan research and analysis service serving governments, universities and corporations across 15 to 20 countries. Funded through a mix of grants, university partnerships and subscriptions, the project maintains strict editorial independence — a stance that regularly draws accusations of being both a CIA spy and a CCP shill, sometimes within the same week. Olander notes that the project has faced sophisticated cyberattacks and has been targeted by Chinese state media, reflecting the sensitive nature of coverage that refuses to adopt binary positions on China.On the much-debated “debt trap diplomacy” thesis, Olander presents a detailed rebuttal drawing on research from institutions including Boston University, Johns Hopkins, Chatham House and the AidData Institute at William and Mary College. He argues that the narrative, first proposed by Indian pundit Brahma Chellaney in 2017, does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Chinese loans to Africa at their peak represented only 18% of the continent’s debt, concentrated mostly in five countries with Angola alone accounting for a third. More importantly, Olander contends that the Chinese were never seeking assets — as Western imperial powers historically did — but rather repayment and cash. The infamous Hambantota port case in Sri Lanka, he explains, resulted from the incompetence and corruption of the Rajapaksa family rather than Chinese asset seizure, with the 99-year lease arising because the Chinese had no interest in taking back the port and pushed for a solution to recover their investment.The interview explores the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative from massive infrastructure lending to “small yet beautiful” projects. Olander identifies four key drivers of this transition: China’s reduced excess capital due to slower economic growth and domestic debt problems; domestic political pushback against large overseas expenditures; borrower countries’ reduced capacity to take on debt following the pandemic; and Beijing’s shift toward private sector and provincial-level engagement rather than central government lending. The Belt and Road’s deliberate lack of institutional structure — no secretariat, no headquarters — has proven to be a feature rather than a bug, allowing it to adapt to changing circumstances.Challenging another common assumption, Olander argues that developing countries exercise considerable agency in navigating great power competition rather than being passive victims buffeted by China-West rivalry. He points to Kenya’s success under President Uhuru Kenyatta in maintaining robust relations with both China and the West, becoming a non-NATO major ally while hosting major Chinese infrastructure projects. Cambodia under Hun Manet represents an even more surprising example, pivoting away from his father Hun Sen’s China-heavy approach to welcome US naval vessels at Chinese-built ports while maintaining engagement with Beijing. Countries like Vietnam have mastered “bamboo diplomacy” — being an enemy to none and a friend to all — a model now emulated across ASEAN.On technology and manufacturing, Olander presents a sobering assessment of China’s dominance. Chinese investment in critical minerals, electric vehicles and new energy represents a 10-15 year head start that Western countries may not be able to overcome. The refining of critical minerals — the most complex and polluting part of the supply chain — is concentrated in China, which has paid an enormous environmental price for this capacity. Chinese electric vehicles entering markets at prices US$20,000 below competitors pose an existential threat to Western automakers, with one Vietnamese analyst predicting Ford, Toyota and Kia will be essentially eliminated from the market within five years. For developing countries, Olander raises provocative questions about whether aspiring to critical mineral processing makes sense given the high environmental costs and limited job creation.Regarding the Pacific Islands, Olander offers a frank assessment that Australian anxieties about Chinese military threats are disproportionate to reality. China lacks the command and control capacity, resupply ships and logistical network to project force this far south — its military is focused on the first and second island chains in the South and East China Seas. Chinese naval exercises near Australia are better understood as signalling — a message that if Australia operates in the South China Sea, China can reciprocate — rather than evidence of genuine invasion capability. The more significant Chinese interest in the Pacific stems from Taiwan diplomacy, as three Pacific Island states still recognise Taipei. Olander argues that China took advantage of a period when Australia, New Zealand and the United States neglected the region, and that more sustained Western engagement, as pursued by Foreign Minister Penny Wong, reduces the incentive for Pacific nations to turn to Beijing.The conversation examines China’s construction of a parallel international governance architecture, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, and what Olander calls the “Five Gs”: the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilisation Initiative, Global AI Initiative, and most recently the Global Governance Initiative. While dismissing BRICS as essentially a “grievance forum”, Olander argues that grievance is itself a powerful political force that should not be underestimated — the same force that propelled Donald Trump to power. When Chinese ambassadors can offer developing country leaders participation in multiple new international frameworks while Western ambassadors speak only of preserving the “rules-based international order”, China’s forward-looking pitch proves more appealing.Olander concludes with advice for Western donors seeking constructive engagement with China. He suggests that Australia find neutral ground — perhaps in Africa or Latin America — to develop working relationships and interoperability with Chinese development actors before attempting cooperation in contested spaces like the Pacific. Drawing on the French model of partnership with China on infrastructure projects in the Global South, he argues that middle powers like Australia and Canada need to develop alternatives to pure reliance on increasingly unpredictable US leadership. The key is to build experience in low-stakes environments where mutual suspicions are less acute, then gradually work toward collaboration in more sensitive regions. Links:Eric Olander delivers the Mitchell Oration at the 2025 Australasian AID Conference (Devpolicy YouTube)China Global South ProjectThe China in Africa Podcast (Apple Podcasts)Global Public Diplomacy Dashboard by AidData ChinaBoston University Global Development Policy CenterChina Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins SAISGriffith Asia Institute Belt and Road Tracker Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre. Read and subscribe to our daily blogs at devpolicy.org.Learn more about our research and join our public events at devpolicy.anu.edu.au.Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram for latest updates on our blogs, research and events.You can send us feedback, and ideas for episodes too, to devpolicy@anu.edu.au.

Pacific democracy: global indices and lived realities

This episode explores the state of democracy in the Pacific, focusing on a joint report by International IDEA and the Australia National University's Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA). The report, released in mid-2025, assesses data from Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. It then looks at all Pacific nations, covering the six themes of grassroots democracy, scale, localised politics, cohabitation, political marginalisation and democratic innovation. After an introduction by International IDEA Director for Asia and the Pacific Leena Rikkila Tamang and DPA head Sonia Palmieri, three ANU Pasifika researchers, Michael Kabuni, Anna Naupa and Romitesh Kant, discuss the findings.Metrics like voter turnout and constituency funds are analysed. Challenges such as gender representation and civil society participation are highlighted. The conversation also touches on the role of international donors and the need for more research to understand the complexity of Pacific democracy.Assessing the State of Democracy in the Pacific - download the International IDEA / DPA reportThe Global State of Democracy 2025: Democracy on the Move - download the International IDEA reportUnspoken Rules of Politics: Uncovering the Motivations of Voters in Vanuatu's Elections - download DPA reportRefereeing democracy: judiciary, parliament and executive in 50 years of Papua New Guinea politics - article by Michael KabuniVoting Methods and Their Distribution in Papua New Guinea - DPA discussion paper by Thiago Cintra Oppermann, Nicole Haley and Colin Wiltshire  Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre. Read and subscribe to our daily blogs at devpolicy.org.Learn more about our research and join our public events at devpolicy.anu.edu.au.Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram for latest updates on our blogs, research and events.You can send us feedback, and ideas for episodes too, to devpolicy@anu.edu.au.

Global public goods and the architecture of cooperation: a conversation with Inge Kaul

Inge Kaul, pioneering development economist and architect of the global public goods framework, discusses her groundbreaking work on international cooperation and development financing in this 2015 interview recorded at her flat in Berlin. Economists define public goods — like street lighting — as things everyone benefits from that nobody can be excluded from using. The problem is that individuals won't voluntarily pay for them, so governments provide them through taxation. Kaul's insight was recognising that globalisation has created global public goods — climate stability, disease control, financial stability — that benefit everyone across borders but that no world government exists to provide. Her central argument: financing cooperation on global public goods requires "new and additional" resources beyond traditional development assistance, because they serve fundamentally different purposes — one driven by moral concern for the poor, the other by shared self-interest. The conversation explores the fierce political resistance her ideas encountered, the chronic diversion of aid money towards global public goods purposes in violation of international agreements, her critical assessment of the SDGs, and the structural reforms needed in multilateral institutions. Kaul passed away in 2023, making this interview a valuable record of her intellectual legacy.The interview begins with Kaul explaining the origins and breakthrough of the global public goods concept. To understand why this concept matters, it helps to start with the basic economic definition. A public good is something that has two key characteristics: it's non-excludable (you can't prevent people from benefiting from it) and non-rivalrous (one person's use doesn't diminish another's). Classic examples include street lighting, national defence or clean air — once these exist, everyone benefits whether they pay for them or not. This creates a problem: rational individuals won't voluntarily pay for public goods because they can "free ride" on others' contributions. That's why governments typically provide public goods through taxation.Kaul's crucial insight was recognising that globalisation has created a new category: global public goods. Just as street lighting benefits everyone in a city regardless of who pays, climate stability, control of infectious diseases, financial market stability and a rules-based trading system benefit everyone on Earth regardless of which countries contribute to providing them. But there's a fundamental problem: there's no world government with the power to tax and provide these goods. Instead, sovereign nations must cooperate voluntarily to produce them. While earlier scholars like Kindleberger and Bruce Russett had used the term in academic journals, it was the 1999 UNDP publication Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, edited by Kaul, that brought the concept into policy discourse.Kaul's central argument was that international cooperation operates along two fundamentally different tracks: traditional development assistance motivated by equity concerns for poor countries, and cooperation to provide global public goods driven by enlightened self-interest shared across all countries, rich and poor alike. Crucially, different countries have different priorities amongst global public goods. An Ethiopian woman facing maternal mortality risks might value accessible medicines more urgently than climate mitigation, even whilst recognising climate's importance. This variation in preferences means that international negotiations around global public goods resemble a political marketplace where agreements require fair terms of trade that make all parties better off. You can't simply impose solutions — you need to negotiate agreements where everyone perceives themselves as better off participating than not participating.Kaul reserves her sharpest criticism for the widespread practice of diverting official development assistance (ODA) towards global public goods purposes, particularly environmental programs. She argues this violates international agreements dating to the 1992 Earth Summit, which stipulated that financing for global environmental challenges should come from "new and additional" resources, not existing aid budgets. By 2015, she notes, approximately 24% of ODA had climate change as a primary purpose, with even more having it as a secondary objective — a figure that had risen from 33% across all global challenges in 1999. This diversion, she contends, undermines the capacity to address the growing number of failed and failing states that need resources for conventional development purposes.When Kaul challenged the chair of the Green Climate Fund at a resource mobilisation meeting in Berlin about whether they would require proof that contributions were "new and additional," the chair had to take a deep breath and look around for someone on the board to answer. The African delegate eventually admitted they had not discussed this issue. Kaul characterises the heads of agencies like the Global Environment Facility, the World Bank, and UNDP as acting in "non-compliance with the international agreements that exist on new and additional financing" when they accept ODA money for environmental purposes.The conversation delves into the intense political resistance Kaul encountered. The United States strongly opposed the three-word phrase "global public goods," fearing it implied supranational taxation or production. Developing countries worried the concept would siphon resources from traditional aid budgets. Some interpreted "public" to mean state-provided goods, evoking concerns amongst former Soviet bloc countries about returning to centrally planned economies. Kaul describes being "shouted and screamed at" in UN meetings, facing opposition so intense that leading economists avoided engaging with the concept. She characterises this treatment as "the severest human rights violation that I have ever experienced in my life." She argues that global public goods are simply a reality created by globalisation — she merely put a name to them.A French-Swedish commission on global public goods further muddled the concept by insisting that global public goods are "things that are good for everybody," which Kaul vigorously opposed. This interpretation, she argued, opened the door for hegemonic powers to impose their preferences on others under the guise of pursuing universal goods. Her dissenting voice stressed that precisely because countries have varying preferences and unequal power, decisions about global public goods are amongst the most contentious in international relations and must be negotiated fairly amongst sovereign equals. The commission even identified ten priority global public goods, which fed into developing country concerns that they would be told what was good for them.The discussion explores practical questions about financing arrangements. Kaul envisions a system where each country has separate budget lines: one for traditional ODA, and others within various line ministries (environment, health, transport, justice) for contributions to global public goods. The aggregate financing for global public goods would be the sum of contributions across these ministries, determined by each country's assessment of its willingness to pay for various global public goods based on how much it values them. She uses the example of New Zealand and ocean acidification — New Zealand cannot simply invest in its own coastal zones if it doesn't also invest upstream in places like Papua New Guinea to address the broader problem.On the question of "incremental costs" — paying developing countries extra when they're asked to adopt more expensive climate-friendly technologies — Kaul is pragmatic. Whilst acknowledging that the concept has methodological difficulties, she argues it's "better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong". When paying countries like Brazil or India to provide environmental services (like forest preservation), she suggests letting countries themselves propose what they consider a fair price, then negotiating mutually beneficial bargains. There should be a profit margin for developing countries, not just reimbursement of actual expenditures.Turning to the Sustainable Development Goals, Kaul is bluntly dismissive: "We will get it. No way. And there's nothing new, nothing new in it." Most SDG targets, she observes, already exist in national policy documents. What matters is implementation, and for that, the world needs fundamental institutional reforms. She advocates for issue-based management structures — essentially CEOs for major global challenges like climate change mitigation, disease control, or outer space governance — that can coordinate action across sectors, levels of government, and national boundaries. Current institutions are organised along geographic and sectoral lines, she argues, when what's needed is the capacity to produce specific outcomes like climate stability or food security.Using the metaphor of Boeing designing an aeroplane, Kaul asks: imagine if the CEO simply said "wouldn't it be nice if we had a Dreamliner?" without actually organising production of wheels, engines, and the outer shell. That's what the international community does with the SDGs — setting aspirational goals without creating the operational structures to achieve them. For climate change, UNFCCC handles negotiations but there's no operational manager, no CEO for climate change mitigation who oversees sub-CEOs for different types of mitigation (energy, clean technology, etc.) and someone dealing with adaptation. The beginnings of issue-based management are emerging — special envoys appointed by UN Secretaries-General, the response to Ebola — but these arise from compulsion rather than foresight.Kaul questions whether organisations like the World Bank have a clear future role, given competition from regional development banks and the emergence of new institutions like the BRICS bank. These "lumpy organisations" were interim solutions for a time when countries lacked capacity and when development cooperation had a stronger country focus. For global public goods, she suggests, the World Bank might serve as an umbrella organisation for global funds, but this requires serious rethinking. She envisions separate global funds financed by different line ministries — climate change programs funded by environment ministries, health programs by health ministries — rather than all international cooperation flowing through foreign affairs ministries and ODA budgets.The interview explores why such logical structural reforms face such resistance. Kaul points to the political economy of budget rules and political incentives: politicians get credit for repainting houses after floods, not for preventing storms through climate mitigation. Budget structures in most countries prevent domestic line ministries from spending abroad, even as their mandates increasingly involve international dimensions. She sees "dual actor failure" — both markets and states failing to provide adequate global public goods — and argues this requires creative thinking about incentives and governance structures. She notes that pension funds and large investment firms actually cry out for standardised environmental regulation because search costs and risks are too high, but governments prefer to maintain flexibility hoping for initial advantage.Despite the barriers, Kaul maintains optimism, noting that reality is forcing changes even when foresight fails. She observes that significant organisational changes have occurred in the UN system over decades. When she started at the UN, the department was called Department of International Economic and Social Affairs; after 1990, "International" was deleted because they started looking into countries, which had been forbidden before. Whilst scholar Richard Cooper suggests three major crises are needed before fundamental reform occurs, Kaul hopes that "a little foresight and goodwill" might suffice, noting that President Obama demonstrated what's possible with political will.Throughout the conversation, Kaul's frustration with intellectual dishonesty and institutional inertia is palpable, yet she defends the UN's efficiency based on her experience: "My God, I mean, we are hard-working, we are efficient, we are quick" compared to national bureaucracies. The challenge is not within organisations but achieving genuine cross-institutional strategies, which requires overcoming departmental resistance and the deeply entrenched silo mentality.The interview captures Kaul's intellectual rigour, her unflinching willingness to challenge powerful institutions, and her commitment to more equitable and rational approaches to international cooperation. Her insistence on distinguishing between equity-driven aid and efficiency-driven cooperation for global public goods, her demand for "new and additional" financing rather than aid diversion, and her vision for issue-based global governance structures remain profoundly relevant to contemporary debates about climate finance, pandemic preparedness, and the architecture of multilateral cooperation.Links:Kaul, Inge (ed). Global Public Goods. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/global-public-goods-9781783472994.htmlKaul, Inge, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, eds. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.Kaul, Inge, Pedro Conceição, Katell Le Goulven, and Ronald U. Mendoza, eds. Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.Stern, Nicholas. "Understanding Climate Finance for the Paris Summit in December 2015 in the Context of Financing for Sustainable Development for the Addis Ababa Conference in July 2015." Policy Paper. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, March 2015. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64533/Kaul, Inge, Robin Davies, Robert Glasser, Michael Gerber and Luca Etter. “Financing the SDGs: Global vs Local Public Goods”, Policy Debate 6.2 | 2015, International Development Policy, Geneva Graduate Institute. https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2068 Davies, Robin. "Public Enemies: The Role of Global Public Goods in Aid Policy Narratives." Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper No. 57, March 2017. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941164 Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre. Read and subscribe to our daily blogs at devpolicy.org.Learn more about our research and join our public events at devpolicy.anu.edu.au.Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram for latest updates on our blogs, research and events.You can send us feedback, and ideas for episodes too, to devpolicy@anu.edu.au.

Water, climate and adaptation: a conversation with Dr Aditi Mukherji

Dr Aditi Mukherji, Principal Scientist at the International Livestock Research Institute and coordinating lead author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's water chapter, discusses her career spanning groundwater management, climate adaptation and the urgent challenge of the 1.5-degree threshold. From her groundbreaking work challenging conventional wisdom about groundwater in eastern India — which led to policy changes benefiting 200,000 farmers — to rehabilitating dying springs in the Himalayas, Mukherji reveals how climate change is transforming every component of the water cycle. She explains why adaptation measures are losing effectiveness as temperatures rise, what the IPCC's water assessment tells us about climate impacts on agriculture, and how pastoral communities in the Global South require different approaches to livestock and climate policy.The conversation begins with Mukherji's entry into water and climate research, shaped by her childhood experiences in the climate-vulnerable Sundarbans region of India and her family's involvement in agriculture. After completing her master's degree, she joined the International Water Management Institute's IWMI-Tata program, which set her on a path to Cambridge University as a Gates Cambridge scholar.Mukherji's early research challenged prevailing assumptions about groundwater scarcity in eastern India. Working in West Bengal, a region receiving three to four times more rainfall than water-scarce areas like Punjab, she discovered that the fundamental problem wasn't water scarcity but restrictive policies. Farmers needed permission from distant government departments to connect to the electricity grid for irrigation, leading to bureaucratic delays and corruption. Her research demonstrated that with metered electricity pricing and proper incentives, farmers could sustainably use groundwater while transitioning away from diesel pumps. This work culminated in a change to groundwater law following a state government transition, resulting in electricity connections for approximately 200,000 farmers. Her subsequent work in the Himalayas addressed a different water crisis: the drying of mountain springs that serve as the sole water source for upland communities. Despite the Himalayas being the water towers of Asia, settlements in the middle elevations — too far from glaciers and too high above river valleys — faced acute scarcity. Mukherji's research revealed that springs were drying primarily due to infrastructure development rather than climate change directly. Road construction and hydropower dam building disrupted the underground flow paths between recharge and discharge points. Using a combination of hydrogeological science, isotope tracing and indigenous knowledge, her team identified recharge areas and implemented rehabilitation programs. This work has influenced major government spring rehabilitation initiatives across India, though she notes that without better planning of infrastructure projects, solutions remain piecemeal.As coordinating lead author of the IPCC's water chapter, Mukherji synthesises five critical findings. First, every component of the water cycle — rainfall, permafrost, glaciers, groundwater — has been transformed by anthropogenic climate change, with largely negative impacts. Second, because water is used across all economic sectors, climate impacts are felt everywhere, particularly in agriculture, the largest consumptive water user. Third, these impacts disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, especially in the Global South where agriculture has become "the parking lot for the poor". Fourth, while water-related adaptation is happening extensively worldwide, its effectiveness varies significantly due to limitations in finance and technology. Fifth, water must be recognised in mitigation discussions, as greenhouse gas reduction strategies — such as bioenergy crops — have substantial water implications.The conversation turns to the declining effectiveness of adaptation as temperatures rise. Mukherji emphasises that 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels is not merely aspirational but represents a critical threshold, particularly for Pacific island nations where it means the difference between staying afloat and sinking. She provides a stark example from India's 2022 heat wave, which struck in early March when wheat was flowering — far earlier than historical patterns. Temperatures of 47-48 degrees during this critical growth stage overwhelmed even heat-tolerant seed varieties and irrigated systems. Breeders struggle to develop varieties that can withstand such extreme heat during flowering, illustrating the physical limits of adaptation.Reflecting on Australia's potential contributions, Mukherji highlights three areas: expanded research collaboration leveraging Australia's extensive scientific networks (universities, CSIRO, ACIAR); increased funding support for less-resourced regions; and sharing knowledge about low-emission agricultural pathways to help developing countries avoid mistakes made during earlier Green Revolution eras. She notes Australia's own experience managing water scarcity, while acknowledging imperfections, offers valuable lessons.Mukherji concludes by explaining her recent transition to the International Livestock Research Institute, where she leads the Livestock and Climate Solutions hub. She argues that livestock discourse must differ between the Global North and Global South. For pastoral populations in Africa, livestock is not just livelihood but culture and a crucial protein source. Her role focuses on ensuring Global South pastoral communities' voices are recognised in climate discussions, avoiding a one-size-fits-all narrative about livestock emissions while addressing the severe droughts these communities face — droughts bearing distinct climate change fingerprints.   Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre. Read and subscribe to our daily blogs at devpolicy.org.Learn more about our research and join our public events at devpolicy.anu.edu.au.Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram for latest updates on our blogs, research and events.You can send us feedback, and ideas for episodes too, to devpolicy@anu.edu.au.

Youth uprisings: understanding the protests in Indonesia and Nepal

In August and September 2024, thousands of young people took to the streets across Southeast and South Asia in unprecedented displays of protest. This episode examines the youth-led demonstrations that erupted in Indonesia on 25 August and Nepal on 8 September, exploring the deeper frustrations driving Generation Z activism beyond the headlines of violence and regime change. Host Amita Monterola speaks with Garry Rosario da Gama, a PhD student researching corruption networks in Indonesia at the Australian National University's Crawford School of Public Policy, and Puspa Paudel, program manager at the Center for Investigative Journalism in Nepal. Together they discuss how embedded corruption, elite privilege and economic inequality triggered mass protests that resulted in ten deaths in Indonesia and regime change in Nepal, where 72 people died and the country appointed its first female prime minister as a caretaker leader.The conversation begins with the immediate triggers for the protests in each country. In Indonesia, demonstrations erupted after 21-year-old taxi driver Afan Kurnia was killed by a police vehicle, with video of the incident going viral. However, Garry explains that this was a breaking point reflecting deeper frustrations with daily struggles including rising food and fuel costs, stagnant wages, unaffordable housing and lack of formal employment for educated youth. Meanwhile, members of Parliament received housing allowances nearly ten times the minimum wage. The protests spread to 144 of Indonesia's 514 districts, bringing together students, taxi drivers and NGOs in a coalition demanding what became known as the “17 plus 8” reforms — seventeen short-term changes within one week and eight longer-term reforms within one year.In Nepal, Puspa describes how the protests began through social media, particularly TikTok and Instagram, where videos of politicians' children and family members flaunting extravagant wealth went viral amongst a generation struggling with extreme poverty. One particularly powerful trigger was a video of a parliamentarian's vehicle hitting an 11-year-old girl without stopping. On 8 September, young protesters gathered peacefully at Maitighar in Kathmandu, but when they attempted to reach the parliamentary building, police opened fire. Nineteen young people, many in school uniforms, were shot in the head with live ammunition. The brutality of the response, combined with the Prime Minister's refusal to resign and lack of remorse from government spokespersons, triggered massive nationwide violence on 9 September that saw the burning of government buildings, ministers' homes, police stations, media houses and business premises.The episode explores the embedded nature of corruption in both countries. Garry's research in Kupang city, Indonesia, reveals how corruption operates through networks connecting contractors, politicians, public servants, law enforcement officials and brokers. Contractors are expected to pay off multiple parties, with only 70-80% of budgets actually going to project work. This explains why roads crumble after one rainy season, clinics run out of medicine and schools lack basic furniture. Indonesians commonly refer to this system as KKN (korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme — corruption, collusion and nepotism), a term enshrined in a 1999 law. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was established in 2002, but the government attempted to weaken it in 2019, triggering public anger.Puspa explains that corruption in Nepal is perceived not merely as a governance issue but as a moral, ethical and political betrayal. Since the 2015 Constitution established Nepal as a federal republic with three tiers of elected government, power has rotated between just three leaders: KP Sharma Oli, Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda”, and Sher Bahadur Deuba. Corruption scandals are routinely used as bargaining chips in coalition negotiations rather than leading to accountability. The Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), Nepal's anti-corruption body, has itself become a tool of political parties who nominate loyalists to protect themselves from prosecution. Young people's first encounters with government institutions — obtaining citizenship cards or registering documents — teach them that middlemen and bribes are necessary to navigate systems that should be straightforward.Both guests discuss the challenges facing watchdog organisations. Garry describes how youth organisations in Kupang, many religion-based, have connections to the very politicians they're meant to criticise. Dependent on government funding for operations, they face pressure from senior politicians to “be more relaxed” and “not push too hard.” Police intimidation compounds these pressures. Puspa notes that whilst individual journalists in Nepal produce excellent investigative reporting on corruption, civil society organisations have failed to pressure government for accountability based on these exposés. Post-2008, older civil society groups lost credibility with younger generations, contributing to the emergence of new, decentralised protest movements.The episode examines the brutal police responses in both countries. In Indonesia, police are widely regarded as one of the most corrupt government institutions, with research from Murdoch University's Jacqui Baker documenting extensive corruption. Rather than serving as guardians of society, police serve those in power. In Nepal, despite orders to use rubber bullets, commanders authorised live ammunition against protesters, resulting in the incident mentioned above — teenagers in school uniforms being shot in the head, with scenes of this broadcast live across social media.A striking feature of the September protests was their organisational structure — or lack thereof. Puspa notes that unlike previous protests with clear organisers, leaders and contact points, the 8 September protest in Nepal emerged through social media calls with no identifiable organisers. Young people made “get ready with me” videos about attending protests, practising songs and dances. This decentralised, leaderless structure created confusion in the aftermath when different groups appeared at negotiation tables with no clear mandate. However, Puspa expresses respect for how protesters, through hours of discussion on Discord, managed to negotiate with the Army Chief and President to appoint former Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi as caretaker Prime Minister — Nepal's first female Prime Minister — while protecting the Constitution and excluding the three established political leaders from negotiations. Elections are planned for March 2025, though the timeframe may prove challenging.In Indonesia, the protests achieved some immediate reforms including reduced parliamentary housing allowances and presidential calls for police reform. However, Garry argues the most significant outcome was the strengthening of civil society coalitions, with youth organisations, NGOs and student groups coming together under one umbrella to hold government accountable. There was also an important shift in public perception, with citizens recognising that even powerful institutions like the Army and police require reform. Public awareness of embedded corruption has increased significantly.The conversation reveals multiple barriers to accountability even when corruption is exposed. In Nepal, Puspa explains that policy-level corruption or kleptocracy is designed to look perfectly legal, making it difficult to challenge. Corruption operates through networks rather than isolated individuals, with powerful people and institutions protecting each other. Institutional barriers include compromised anti-corruption bodies, whilst societal barriers include normalised expectations that middlemen and bribes are simply how things work. The weakness of civil society in demanding action based on investigative journalism creates a gap between exposure and accountability. In Indonesia, similar patterns emerge with youth organisations caught between their watchdog role and dependence on government funding, while police and prosecutors are themselves embedded in corruption networks.Both guests identify these embedded corruption networks as the fundamental driver of youth protest. Despite Indonesia and Nepal being classified as middle-income countries by the World Bank, ordinary citizens see no development gains in their daily lives. Instead, they witness elite families flaunting wealth on social media whilst struggling themselves with poverty, unemployment and crumbling public services. Generation Z, highly active on platforms like TikTok and Instagram, can see the disconnect between official narratives of progress and lived reality with unprecedented clarity. When traditional civil society organisations and anti-corruption institutions fail to deliver accountability, mass street protest becomes the only remaining avenue for demanding change.The episode concludes by noting that similar youth-led protests have occurred across the region in recent years, including in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Timor-Leste, suggesting these are not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern of generational frustration with embedded corruption and elite capture of development gains. The Devpolicy blog welcomes submissions analysing these governance challenges across the region.Nepal resources:Center for Investigative Journalism NepalCommission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), NepalAn update: Gen Z protests one month on, Kalam WeeklyIndonesia resources:ANU Indonesia Update 2024 presentation by Liam Gammon on ANU TV YouTubeCommentary on corruption in Indonesia by Jacqui Baker, University of MelbourneIndonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)Devpolicy Blogs on Indonesia Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre. Read and subscribe to our daily blogs at devpolicy.org.Learn more about our research and join our public events at devpolicy.anu.edu.au.Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram for latest updates on our blogs, research and events.You can send us feedback, and ideas for episodes too, to devpolicy@anu.edu.au.