The Baltic States Mark Two Decades of NATO Membership

This year, NATO marks its 75th anniversary, while the Baltic countries celebrate 20 years as members of the alliance. Dr. Lukas Milevski speaks about the history of that inclusion, and shares his thoughts about the future.

Milevski is a tenured assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategic studies in the BA International Studies and MA International Relations programs. He has published widely on strategy, including two books with Oxford University Press: The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (2016) and The West’s East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018).

Baltic Ways is a podcast brought to you by the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI.

Transcript

Indra Ekmanis: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways, a podcast bringing you interviews and insights from the world of Baltic studies. I'm your host, Dr. Indra Ekmanis. And today we speak with Dr. Lucas Milevski, a tenured assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategic studies. This year marks 75 years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 20 years of the Baltic states' inclusion in that alliance. Dr. Milevski gives us his insights into the history, and what may be next for the Baltic states as part of NATO. Stay tuned.

IE: Thank you so much for joining us today on Baltic Ways. Perhaps we can start with you telling us a little bit about yourself, your background and how you came to be involved in this field of study.

Lukas Milevski: I'm Lukas Milevski. I'm presently an assistant professor at Leiden University in the Netherlands. And for an American audience, it's worthwhile to mention that in the Netherlands, assistant professor is a tenured position. And I research and write about military strategy in general, theory, history, contemporary analysis, as well as contemporary military defense.

I am a Latvian American dual citizen, so I've also maintained both a personal and a professional interest in Baltic defense. I published my first piece on that topic way back in 2010 when I was still a master's student. I published a book on the subject, The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective, in 2018, and have continued writing on the topic regularly ever since for various venues, including FPRI's own Baltic Bulletin.

IE: Well, thank you for sharing that background. We are here to talk a little bit about NATO today. NATO this year celebrates its 75th anniversary in April. In March, the Baltic states also celebrate 20 years of being in the alliance, having joined in 2004. As we commemorate these milestones, how would you describe the organization's evolution, its history with the Baltic states from your perspective?

LM: So 75 years of history is quite a bit, especially for an international alliance. And I'm sure there will be plenty written on this history to mark the 75th anniversary. So what I'll do now is just sketch out certain inflection points in NATO's history and the degree to which the Baltic states featured in those points or experienced consequences as a result, whether positive or negative.

So the first inflection point is obviously 75 years ago itself, when NATO was founded. In the words of Lord Ismay, who was its first Secretary General, NATO was founded to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out. We don't consider that second purpose relevant anymore, but the other two have remained wholly relevant.

The Baltic states during this time were, of course, occupied by the Soviet Union, and simply formed part of the enemy for NATO. The next real inflection point was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, which allowed the Baltic states to spring out of national captivity, and begin plotting their own national courses again. Unsurprisingly, this pointed them toward NATO, which in any case, had lost its primary reason for existence and only awkwardly found itself seeking organizational purpose in intervening in the Western Balkans as Yugoslavia collapsed. During the 1990s, there was a Western defense professional debate about Baltic membership in NATO, which played out in various venues, including professional and academic journals.

Notably, there were some quite prescient arguments that leaving them out of NATO would ultimately be destabilizing as they would present power vacuums, which would only invite invasion at some subsequent undetermined later date. You know, essentially exactly what happened to Ukraine.

IE: Right.

LM: The next key inflection point was the terror attack on, terror attacks on 9/11, which finally gave NATO a mission again, counterterrorism, and incidentally the only invocation of Article 5, NATO's mutual defense clause, in the history of the alliance, by the United States. In the early atmosphere of the war on terror, Russia was a quasi ally, and this atmosphere helped, perhaps enabled, the Baltic states to slip into NATO and the European Union simultaneously in spring 2004 — March for NATO, May for the EU.

The relatively warm atmosphere between NATO and Russia, and NATO's counter terrorism and counter insurgency focus, somewhat precluded NATO membership from meaning terribly much for the Baltic States. There is no real contingency defense planning for national defense, for example. Because the only threat was Russia, and the West mostly did not see Russia as a possible threat, the Baltic states and maybe some other Eastern Flank countries excepted. The one exception to this relative negligence was the Baltic air policing mission, which began right from the Baltic accession to NATO and continues to the present day. It took until the next inflection point in 2008, Russia's invasion of Georgia, to shake NATO's complacency about Russia, albeit not by that much.

IE: Yeah.

LM: Baltic defense planning became permissible, but without a proper political decision, more sort of as an annex to defense planning for Polish defense. And then NATO and most of its constituent countries sank back into unwarranted complacency. The story somewhat repeated in 2014. Russia invaded another country, NATO responded, including this time by redefining Russia as a potential enemy and moving some tripwire forces into the Baltic states.

IE: Can you say what that means? What a tripwire force is?

LM: Idea of a tripwire force is simply to have forces from other member countries present in the region so that if Russia were to invade, they'd not just be shooting at local Baltic armed forces, but also those of ideally each of the other member states as well. And this would then immediately, in principle, involve those other states in Baltic defense.

So NATO moves some tripwire forces into the Baltic states. This was probably mostly due to strenuous U.S. pressure on European member states, which seemed rather unwilling at the time. Nonetheless, this was done, and then afterward NATO slipped back into a certain degree of unwarranted complacency, again, particularly the European member states and the Western European member states.

And finally, most recently, 2022 and the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine. Baltic defense is again high on the agenda. NATO's four deployed forces, the tripwire forces, are to be expanded from battalion size to brigade size, basically from 1,000 men to about four to five thousand-ish. And the unwarranted complacency about Russia has yet to return.

Hopefully it won't, but of course we don't know the future. As a result of this infection point as well, Finland and, finally, Sweden have also joined NATO, thereby turning the Baltic [Sea] into a NATO lake and increasing military and naval security in the region. But what we really see as a history is that NATO has only gradually, and mostly unwillingly, paid any attention, let alone serious attention, to Baltic defense.

Fortunately, for most of that history, it turned out not to be a fatal mistake. And we can now hope, and perhaps work, to develop NATO defense planning and policies finally to ensure real Baltic defense. This is work not only by NATO or the larger states, but also, and of course crucially, by the Baltic states themselves, and we do see that this is happening.

IE: Yeah. It strikes me that, you know, we have many headlines in U.S. outlets since 2022 and the Russian invasion — full scale invasion of Ukraine — featuring Baltic leaders. Just the other day I heard Kaja Kallas on, on NPR's “Morning Edition,” for example. And so this has become kind of a mainstay.

I wonder if you can tell us — we talked about that now the Baltics are here in NATO for two decades — and over the last two decades, how has NATO's presence influenced regional security dynamics in the Baltic region? Maybe, the addition of Finland and Sweden and the creation of Lake NATO, if you will. But also how have the Baltic states themselves influenced NATO?

LM: So NATO's presence in the Baltic Sea region, particularly with the accession of the Baltic states, resolved the one major geopolitical issue which I already mentioned, the notion of the power vacuum in between NATO and Russia, at least in this region, which could have — and knowing Russia — would have eventually invited trouble. And so in principle, this issue is no more. But in practice, as I was sort of saying, in terms of defense planning and everything, this remains a work in progress. So besides this key point, NATO's presence in the Baltic region over the last 20 years hasn't really affected security dynamics all that much, I think, for a number of reasons.

First of all, besides the Baltic region's national forces — the local Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian forces and so on — the NATO presence itself has been quite minimal for most of those two decades. The air policing mission since 2004, the tripwire forces from 2016 onward, but the additional NATO non-Baltic physical, material, military manpower capability to affect security dynamics meaningfully has not really been there.

It's only now, you know, in the past few years that we've been seeing some actual substantial change. As I also already mentioned, for most of the past 20 years, NATO has not been focusing on territorial defense, but it's been looking halfway across the world, generating expeditionary capabilities to wage war in Afghanistan.

So the alliance had little time, little capability, and little desire really to consider the Baltic seriously. Third, for the early years of the war on terror, Russia was, as I said, something of an ally. And moreover, it was also wrestling with its own internal security issues. Its war with Georgia in 2008 showed major problems in its armed forces, which it spent the next few years fixing, or at least thinking it was fixing them.

And as a bit of an aside on this war: This, the Russian perspective, is very distinct. They feel like they almost lost the war because of how poorly their armed forces performed, hence the need to reform them. And then of course, after Georgia, it focused on supporting the Assad regime in Syria and then add into all this is its perpetual fixation with Ukraine in 2014, even prior to 2014. And of course, after 2014 as well. So there's a good recipe for Russia also perhaps not dedicating an enormous amount of attention to the Baltic states either, and I'm no fan of Russia, but I think it's notable nonetheless that at the worst of the 2008 financial crisis, and Latvia was hit harder than most, there was no special Russian attempt to exploit the crisis to topple the Latvian or any other Baltic government.

You know, nothing beyond the usual corruption, money laundering, subversion, and general criminality. Why not is a different question, and one which we can't answer. You know, even if we had Putin here on a table, and we cracked his skull open with a hammer and chisel, presumably we would find that he had a brain, but that wouldn't tell us anything about his thoughts. So we don't know why they didn't do anything, but it is perhaps notable that they didn't really do anything — at least nothing special.

Finally, if you look at the defense literature, once Western military analysts began paying attention to the problems of Baltic defense again after 2014, the recurring theme which you see is one of apprehension: That Russia has the advantage in the Baltic Sea region. Because with its missiles — anti-ship missiles, anti-air missiles — it could create a Baltic bubble, from which, it could deny access to NATO forces. So there's a distinct sense in which it's actually been Russia which maintains an advantage in the Baltic Sea region.

And this is only beginning to change now as a result of the war and its consequences. Both in terms of Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO, as well as in terms of damage to Russia's own armed forces. And in terms of Baltic influence, I see relatively little. As mentioned, improvements of Baltic defense have generally followed Russian aggression, and usually have been as little as NATO believed it could get away with, especially the Western European countries. Is that changing now? We'll see.

IE: Yeah, well, tell us tell us in a little bit about — I mean, I feel like there was a lot of conversation early on in after the renewed invasion about the Baltics kind of having this “we told you so mentality,” to their Western Western European partners and to their American partners too in some to some degree. And then, yes, we have seen kind of these incremental shifts in the way that NATO is taking their Eastern Flank a little bit more seriously. You mentioned the increase in their tripwire forces. But what about tangible sort of feeling on the ground? How do you assess NATO's ability to deter a potential threat and uphold security? What are some of those key challenges, or maybe opportunities, in the Baltics? You talked about the Russian advantage. And maybe aside from NATO, what are the steps that the Baltic states are taking on their own? We have a lot of talk about defense investments in the Baltic states themselves. So, I'd love to hear your thoughts.

LM: Yes. Well, to start with deterrence, the problem with deterrence is that, sort of, to deter, the infinitive verb is grammatically correct, but strategically inaccurate. We cannot deter. The other side chooses to be deterred. We can provide the reasons for them to choose to be deterred, but beyond that, it's fundamentally out of our hands. And we have a hard time knowing what the other side is thinking. You know, again, think of poking around Putin's brain, it tells us nothing. Worse still, he has to believe that anything we try to do is to strengthen deterrence. You know, truly, if we're putting forces into the Baltic states, it's for the purposes of deterrence and not something else, invasion.

IE: Right.

LM: But what the Russians are doing is giving constant signals that they don't trust the NATO presence in the Baltic states. They feel like a country under siege and generally speaking, they're paranoid of surprise attacks. So in communicating this to us, are they telling the truth or are they just cynically trying to dissuade us? Or is a little of Column A, a little of Column B, depending on the person speaking at that moment? We don't know, but this complicates the picture.

It does not, however, mean that we should appease them and not try to strengthen deterrence. We obviously should. That's part of NATO's core mission. So then, going to what NATO is trying to do or what it can try to do — NATO's fundamental posture to try to instill deterrence rests on Article 5, the Mutual Defense Clause, as well as extended nuclear deterrence. In abstract, the latter is always a hard sell, just like it was during the Cold War. The notion of extended nuclear deterrence is that, essentially, the United States would protect Europe with a nuclear umbrella. It's extending its hand, willing to take nuclear blows to protect its allies. But would the United States, or for that matter Britain or France, you know, really sacrifice Washington, D.C., London, or Paris for the sake of Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius?

That's impossible to know, but at the same time, it's not a possibility that the Russians can ignore. So, allies never find it particularly compelling, and this was true during the Cold War as well, but adversaries do still have to take it seriously. Article 5, meanwhile, depends on NATO's ability actually to sustain a major military operation in the Baltic states, something which it is still in the process of trying to develop. It might also rely on keeping substantial forces positioned in the Baltic states, something which it is also developing. I mentioned the forward deployed forces expanding from battalion to brigade size, which will help with that. Germany is planning on deploying an entire brigade into Lithuania. And so this will all help with that.

Is this enough to present a sufficiently credible threat of successful defense that the Russians would think better of any hypothetical future invasion? We simply don't know. Prudence is pulling us in two ways. We don't want to leave the Baltics undefended because that might invite invasion. But at the same time, we don't want to put too much in because the Russians might take that really seriously the wrong way. We need to find somewhere a middle ground, notwithstanding all of NATO's and especially all, all other American commitments elsewhere in the world.

So, it's a thorny problem.

IE: Yeah.

LM: As for the Baltic states themselves, they face a wide variety of challenges to improving their own defense. The most fundamental one is that the Russian threat can be quite multi-dimensional, and so the Baltic states need to have some sort of capability to answer, to some degree, each of those dimensions, even without NATO support, to buy time for NATO support to arrive.

You know, we're talking from land invasion with heavy armor to airborne coup de main, such as what Russia tried to do in the very first days of their invasion, renewed invasion of Ukraine back in February 2022. Russian air and missile strikes against land, sea, and air targets, cyber attacks, and electronic warfare, and many other forms of attack.

You know, Russia can make the life of a Baltic defense planner really difficult, just as it currently is for Ukrainian strategists. So the Baltic challenge is spreading their limited budgets around in ways which are, or at least appear to be, good enough. At least good enough to be able to blunt an initial attack and buy time.

So for this reason, Latvia and Estonia jointly procured a German IRIS-T medium range air defense system, which has been doing excellent work in Ukraine to help contribute against the missile plane and the possibility of an airborne coup de main threat. If you have air defense, it's less likely that Russian helicopters will get through, that Russian missiles will get through, and so on. Baltic states are developing a Baltic defense line, and they are expanding their armed forces, including reintroducing conscription, in Latvia's case, to help defend against a major ground invasion. They are procuring coastal defense systems to deny Russia the ability to attack them by sea.

And this is all very good. It's very important. It's demonstrating a clear will to defend to the rest of NATO that the Baltic states will defend themselves in the hypothetical event of invasion. And so it puts additional political and moral pressure on the rest of NATO also to step up more. But of course, the Baltic states, on their own will, will simply never be enough to defend successfully against a country with a military the size of Russia's.

This is an unavoidable fact. And this is the final challenge for the Baltic States, that ultimately they cannot guarantee their own national security, their own national survival by themselves without NATO support if Russia were really to try to challenge it with a major invasion.

IE: Yeah. You mentioned this kind of goodwill, or moral pressure that is also part of the Baltic states' defense plan in some ways. And I am thinking about that in their accession and the way that the Baltic states responded and showed up, for example, in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. So, I wonder if you can tell us a little bit about how the Baltic states have contributed to NATO's missions and operations. Whether or not their participation has shaped any of the alliance's strategies or priorities.

LM: So ever since they regained independence and developed their own armed forces, the Baltic states have tried to be good citizens of the liberal international order and have committed forces to international operations, including NATO, but also EU missions, UN missions, other allied missions — of course, within the scope of their own available resources.

For most missions over the past 30 years, the Baltic commitment has been small, both comparatively and sort of absolutely. And of course, the degree of commitment for each mission in which the Baltic states individually or collectively have been involved has also varied over time.

So just to sort of touch on a few examples, they sent soldiers to the various missions resulting from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. Even today, Latvia and Lithuania are still contributing to KFOR in Kosovo. Lithuania has one soldier there, but with a Seimas mandate for up to five, while Latvia has committed 136 military personnel to that mission.

Estonia, meanwhile, participated in the French Operation Barkhane in Mali, originally dedicating 50 troops and raising the number to 95 in 2019, until the end of the operation there in 2022. And Estonia's participation in Barkhane was appreciated in Paris and led to a considerable amount of French goodwill.

So this indicates the importance of not just NATO missions, but looking beyond NATO missions, to other missions, because, yes, a lot of countries are part of NATO, they're also part of EU, membership overlaps, and even contributing to other states' national missions can have beneficial consequences within the NATO context.

IE: Sure.

LM: Most prominently, of course, the Baltic states had all contributed troops to the wars in Iraq as part of the Coalition of the Willing, as well as to the International Security Assistance Force, the NATO force in Afghanistan. So from the Baltic point of view of the past 20 years, which is totally understandable, the United States was always going to be the single most important guarantor of Baltic military and national security.

The subsequent question — the degree to which Baltic involvement has led to influence — is much less clear. For one, you know, much of that would happen behind closed doors. But it is fair to say that there were some early attitudes toward the Baltic states, which were quite fundamentally not promising, notably from some Western European countries.

The most infamous example is probably Jacques Chirac's outburst, as president of France in 2003 — and this was admittedly, you know, a year before Baltic accession to NATO and the EU — dismayed by the Vilnius letter, which a number of current Eastern Flank countries drafted in support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and publicly criticized those Eastern Flank countries, or now Eastern Flank countries, for failing to take the opportunity, and this is a quote, to 'shut up.' So there's always been this sort of sense that the older member states, particularly in Western Europe, simply know better than the newer Eastern Flank members, including, totally absurdly, about Russia.

This has proved a rather difficult cultural bias for the Baltic states and other Eastern Flank countries to overcome. And one in which the star player in any Baltic success, as I've already said, really has been Russia for consistently defying European expectations and European excuses for Russian behavior.

So from 2022 onward, the older Western European member states have finally, and I do think it's finally, begun learning a bit of humility, which opens up more space and willingness to listen to others. The U.S. pattern in all this has been notably different pretty consistently for most of the past 25 years. New administrations entered the White House seeking cooperation with Russia. Bush, after 9/11, when he looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul, famously. Obama, when he sought to reset relations with Russia. Trump, with his near total subservience to Russia. Yet almost as consistently, the outgoing administration had become totally disillusioned about Russia as a result of outrageous Russian behavior. Bush after the invasion of Georgia, Obama after the invasion of Crimea and Donbass. Only Trump didn't experience that. And with the Biden administration, which came in in 2020, it at least entered office finally already wary of Russia. So the U.S. track record is actually quite different from the Western European track record. It's much more variable, much more uneven, but at key moments, it's been much more in favor of Russia, of Baltic defense, and of supporting the Baltic states.

IE: Yeah. So NATO leaders are going to gather in D.C. in July, for the summit that marks the 75th anniversary of the alliance. But we're also coming up on the American elections in November. So I wonder how you see the US elections impacting NATO, especially as we are looking again at a rematch between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, and what you might see for the future of NATO in the coming years — particularly for the Baltics, but more generally too.

LM: This is, of course, the big question, and the correct answer is, it's impossible to say. It'll be hard enough to imagine, even when we know who the next president will be, let alone now. But we can talk about what we know now, and try to think about the future.

Because both Trump and Biden do have presidential track records now. And Trump's isn't as bad as everyone imagined beforehand, but that's largely because policy is slow to change. And throughout much of his administration, the Department of Defense was following plans already laid down and confirmed and set in motion by the previous Obama administration. Moreover, Trump actually had intelligent adults in the room with him for much of his administration, and the Senate in particular remained very pro-NATO. Both of which limited the negative consequences.

In the unfortunate event of a Trump victory in November, the basic policy reality that change is hard to achieve will remain in force. But he is unlikely to have in the room nearly the same number or quality of intelligent adults as before. The Republican contingent in the Senate may also become less pro-NATO as well, with Mitch McConnell passing the torch — his pro-NATO attitudes being one of his very few virtues.

On the other hand, you know, we can, and if you like, should, hope for a Biden victory. Then hopefully there won't be much change, at least for another four years. So just a continued trajectory for strengthening Baltic defense further. Or we might even plausibly expect, or hope for, at least, change for the better, as the Republican Party, which has been held hostage by Trump over the past half year or so in particular, will lose the need to try to deny Democrats political victories in the lead up to the national election, which is something they're doing now.

But besides the variable of the U.S., there is still Europe, and it remains a variable as well. One increasingly highlighted as Trump has had contact with Orbán recently.

IE: Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary.

LM: Yes, who is also quite pro-Russian. But so in Europe too, a certain degree of pro-Russian feeling is spreading. Most recently With Robert Fico, a Slovakian populist, being elected prime minister in Slovakia. Moreover, many European countries still are not hitting the 2 percent of GDP mark agreed upon nearly a decade ago now, in September, 2014. And even if they were, the money spending practices of certain number of states is quite suspect. Now, regardless of the amount of money, the German defense budget is in an absolute state and one which more money on its own simply will not change at this moment. You need to change the processes, the bureaucracy, and the practices first before more money will make much of a difference. We have seen, however, a recent headline from Trump saying that if European NATO members were to pay more then, he'd be more amenable to staying in NATO.

So he's shown some degree of flexibility, whether that's just for show or real is a different question. But nonetheless, Trump is trying to soften some bits of his sort of anti-NATO rhetoric. And even as the war continues in Ukraine and even assuming NATO countries individually and in cooperation are able to return to supporting Ukraine effectively, the next years will see NATO as an alliance, or its member states as individuals, addressing a wide variety of problems to both improve the quality and the quantity of the defense which can be provided — to the Baltic states, to Europe in general. Every Western military is probably feeling a certain sense of crisis in the face of what they see going on in Ukraine right now. And, going, sort of going back to the professional literature which I read on military strategy and all that, there have been some expressed doubts as to whether or not the U.S. could actually wage war. A major war going back to well before the Russian invasion in 2022 and what we see going on now and the difficulty of winning on the battlefield and so on and so forth. There's a lot of thinking going on, so a lot of this doesn't have much to do necessarily with political leadership, but it's just how militaries are trying to reimagine how they might want to, or perhaps might need to do things on and off the battlefield in order to continue being effective organizations for national defense. So the presidential race is a big story, but there's plenty of other stories, as well.

IE: Yeah. So reminding us there's plenty going on beneath the surface beyond political leadership changes. Well, Dr. Milevski, I want to thank you so much for being with us on Baltic Ways, for giving us your insights as we are approaching these significant milestones, this significant year for NATO, for the Baltics in NATO. And we really appreciate your commentary.

Thank you. Thank you so much.

LM: Thank you for having me.

IE: Thank you for tuning in to Baltic ways. A podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A note that the views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. I'm your host Indra Ekmanis.

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