LW - Against most AI risk analogies by Matthew Barnett

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Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Against most AI risk analogies, published by Matthew Barnett on January 14, 2024 on LessWrong.
I dislike most AI risk analogies that I've seen people use. While I think analogies can be helpful for explaining a concept to people for the first time, I think they are frequently misused, and often harmful. The fundamental problem is that analogies are consistently mistaken for, and often deliberately intended as arguments for particular AI risk positions. And the majority of the time when analogies are used this way, I think they are misleading and imprecise, routinely conveying the false impression of a specific, credible model of AI, even when no such credible model exists.
Here is a random list of examples of analogies that I found in the context of AI risk:
Stuart Russell: "It's not exactly like inviting a superior alien species to come and be our slaves forever, but it's sort of like that."
Rob Wiblin: "It's a little bit like trying to understand how octopuses are going to think or how they'll behave - except that octopuses don't exist yet, and all we get to do is study their ancestors, the sea snail, and then we have to figure out from that what's it like to be an octopus."
Eliezer Yudkowsky: "The character this AI plays is not the AI. The AI is an unseen actress who, for now, is playing this character. This potentially backfires if the AI gets smarter."
Nate Soares: "My guess for how AI progress goes is that at some point, some team gets an AI that starts generalizing sufficiently well, sufficiently far outside of its training distribution, that it can gain mastery of fields like physics, bioengineering, and psychology [...] And in the same stroke that its capabilities leap forward, its alignment properties are revealed to be shallow, and to fail to generalize.
Norbert Wiener: "when a machine constructed by us is capable of operating on its incoming data at a pace which we cannot keep, we may not know, until too late, when to turn it off. We all know the fable of the sorcerer's apprentice..."
Geoffry Hinton: "It's like nuclear weapons. If there's a nuclear war, we all lose. And it's the same with these things taking over."
Joe Carlsmith: "I think a better analogy for AI is something like an engineered virus, where, if it gets out, it gets harder and harder to contain, and it's a bigger and bigger problem."
Ajeya Cotra: "Corporations might be a better analogy in some sense than the economy as a whole: they're made of these human parts, but end up pretty often pursuing things that aren't actually something like an uncomplicated average of the goals and desires of the humans that make up this machine, which is the Coca-Cola Corporation or something."
Ezra Klein: "As my colleague Ross Douthat wrote, this is an act of summoning. The coders casting these spells have no idea what will stumble through the portal."
SKLUUG: "AI risk is like Terminator! AI might get real smart, and decide to kill us all! We need to do something about it!"
These analogies cover a wide scope, and many of them can indeed sometimes be useful in conveying meaningful information. My point is not that they are never useful, but rather that these analogies are generally shallow and misleading. They establish almost nothing of importance about the behavior and workings of real AIs, but nonetheless give the impression of a model for how we should think about AIs.
And notice how these analogies can give an impression of a coherent AI model even when the speaker is not directly asserting it to be a model. Regardless of the speaker's intentions, I think the actual effect is frequently to plant a detailed-yet-false picture in the audience's mind, giving rise to specious ideas about how real AIs will operate in the future.
Plus, these analogies are frequently chosen selectively - picked on the basis of ev...