Last time we spoke about the allied invasion of Balikpapan. In June 1945, the war in the Pacific escalated as American forces, spearheaded by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fiercely battled the entrenched Japanese on Luzon. Despite harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Americans made crucial advances, capturing key positions that rekindled hope for the Filipino people. Concurrently, preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan intensified. The Australian 7th Division assembled for a...
Last time we spoke about the allied invasion of Balikpapan. In June 1945, the war in the Pacific escalated as American forces, spearheaded by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fiercely battled the entrenched Japanese on Luzon. Despite harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Americans made crucial advances, capturing key positions that rekindled hope for the Filipino people. Concurrently, preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan intensified. The Australian 7th Division assembled for a July 1 amphibious assault against a heavily fortified Japanese defense, known for its formidable coast artillery and entrenched positions. The Australians faced fierce opposition upon landing; however, skilled maneuvering and robust artillery support allowed them to swiftly gain a foothold. As the Australians secured their beachhead, they marked the beginning of a challenging campaign against determined Japanese forces in Balikpapan, setting the stage for further confrontations in the Pacific theater.
This episode is Victory at Bougainville
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We last left off on Bougainville, by mid-April, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer’s 15th Brigade had commenced its crucial task of relieving Brigadier Field’s weary and battered 7th Brigade. This transition came at a pivotal moment when Brigadier Stevenson’s 11th Brigade successfully secured the Soraken Peninsula, a strategic point on Bougainville's southern coast, while also continuing their efforts to contain enemy forces along the notorious Numa Numa Trail, a crucial supply route for Japanese troops. Supported by reinforcements in artillery and air power, Generals Savige and Bridgeford were optimistic about continuing their limited offensive toward the south. Their immediate objective was to capture the line of the Hongorai River, considered a significant tactical advantage, followed by the Hari River, which would serve as the 15th Brigade’s main aim. On the opposing side, General Kanda had learned a harsh lesson about the ineffectiveness of banzai charges during the fierce fighting at the Battle of Slater’s Knoll. This costly experience prompted him to alter his strategy significantly. He decided to pull his remaining troops back to a defensive perimeter focused around Buin, which is located in the southern region of Bougainville. Here, he reinforced his defenses with garrison troops from Kieta, situated on the eastern side of Bougainville, the Shortlands Islands to the northwest, and the Fauros Islands to the northeast. However, with this concentration of forces not expected to be operational until July, the troops stationed in the forward areas were tasked with executing a critical delaying action in the meantime, buying precious time for reinforcements to arrive.
Meanwhile, on April 17, the Australian 24th Battalion began its advance along the Buin Road, a vital route for both supply and troop movement. Two companies made their way toward Dawe’s Creek, while another company launched an assault against the enemy strongholds at Kindara. Remarkably, they broke through enemy lines the following day, pushing further to Sindou Creek and Umam Creek. Here, they faced multiple sharp counterattacks over the next week, demonstrating the fierce resistance from Japanese forces determined to hold their ground. As patrols moved deeper into the thick jungle on either side of the Buin Road, the struggle became increasingly intense. Each advance was hard-fought, marked by skirmishes that tested the resolve and endurance of the Australian soldiers. Finally, on April 26, the advance resumed in earnest, making rapid gains toward the Hongorai River. The combination of heavy air support and relentless artillery bombardment had effectively dispelled any opposition along the route, allowing the Australians to push forward with renewed vigor.
By May 4, as the 24th Battalion finally approached the banks of the Hongorai River, they encountered significant resistance. However, on the 4th Lieutenant Lawn's platoon was advancing with two tanks and a bulldozer when the crew of the leading tank came to a log across the road and saw movement in the bush. A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank cut the leaves away and revealed the barrel of a field gun. The first round fired from the tank's 2-pounder disabled the enemy gun and the enemy seemed to flee. Farther ahead, however, a mine exploded at the rear of the second tank. It was discovered that it had been exploded with a wire by a Japanese concealed in the bush. Henceforward mines and concealed guns were encountered more and more frequently. They were detected chiefly by the practised eyes of the engineer teams of Major Needham's 15th Field Company who became increasingly skilful. Mechanical detectors were defeated by several sorts of mine employed wooden boxes filled with T.N.T., for example; but their presence was betrayed by protruding fuses, wires, disturbed earth, and confirmed by prodding with a bayonet. As the 24th Battalion neared the Hongorai it became evident that the Japanese intended to make the Australians pay a price for each advance, and that they were willing to trade a field gun for a tank at every opportunity. On the 4th and many later occasions leading tanks were fired on at a range of a few yards by guns cleverly concealed beside the track, but in positions from which the Japanese could not hope to extricate them. In other respects also the Japanese tactics were improving and their striking power was strengthened. Each forward Australian battalion was now under frequent artillery fire, evidently directed by Japanese observers who remained close to the Australian advance, and it was this which was now causing most of the casualties. The shells usually burst in the trees and their fragments were scattered over a wide area with lethal effects. To counter the tanks the Japanese were now establishing their positions not astride the track but about 100 yards from it in places where the tanks could not reach them until a side track had been made.
The Hongorai River, a critical geographical landmark, ran through Bougainville's lush terrain, acting as both a natural barrier and tactical objective. In late April, the 9th Battalion had continued to push forward across the Huio River, a vital waterway that intersected with Japanese defenses. They faced some enemy resistance but managed to clear the Horinu-Rumiki Trail by the end of the month. This narrow, winding path had strategic importance, connecting various units and enabling supplies to move closer to the frontline. On May 3, the 9th Battalion was finally relieved by the 57th/60th Battalion, which, due to its relative inexperience, found progress challenging along the Commando Road a route named after the elite Australian commandos who often operated in this area. Their inexperience in facing seasoned Japanese troops led to slower advances in the crucial days that followed.
Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron had been conducting deep reconnaissance patrols towards the Hari River and along the Tiger Road, determined to discover the extent of Japanese defenses south of the Hongorai. The Tiger Road, notorious for its rugged conditions, was pivotal for troop movements in the region. On May 5, the 24th Battalion, now bolstered by a newly assigned tank squadron, resumed its advance with renewed determination. However, they were once again halted by fierce defenders who launched a strong yet costly counterattack the following morning. This desperate but valiant effort by the Japanese troops resulted in significant casualties and demonstrated their resolve to maintain control of the Hongorai line. Subsequently, the Japanese forces ultimately abandoned their positions along the Hongorai during the night. Finally, on May 7, the Australians reached the Hongorai River, marking a significant milestone in their campaign. At that moment, the 57th/60th Battalion was securing a crucial crossing over the Hongorai on the Commando Road, enabling further advances into enemy territory.
With the next objective focused on the line stretching from the Hari River to Monoitu and Kapana, Brigadier Hammer’s battalions shifted their tactics for the second and third weeks of May. They undertook deep patrols into Japanese-occupied territory, gathering vital intelligence while also seeking to harass the enemy and disrupt their operations. Additionally, the commandos maintained their patrols along the challenging Tiger Road and established a new patrol base further north at Monorei. This base would serve as a critical outpost for monitoring enemy movements and launching further operations. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion explored the rugged areas south of the Buin Road, successfully clearing the Aitara Mission. This mission played a crucial role in their broader strategies, as it prepared them to execute a wide flanking maneuver aimed at cutting the road east of the Hongorai, further encircling Japanese forces.
To support the advancing Australian forces, New Zealand aircraft launched significant attacks on Japanese concentrations positioned along the Buin and Commando Roads. On May 17, the 57th/60th Battalion crossed the upper reaches of the Hongorai River, advancing across a wide front along the Commando Road to draw the enemy's attention to that area. On the eve of this move Hammer issued an order of the day in a characteristic style. He spoke of his "undying admiration" for and "extreme confidence" in his men and told them that the next few weeks might see the major defeat of the Japanese in south Bougainville. "Go to battle as you have done in the last month and no enemy can withstand you." In the subsequent days, they successfully secured territory up to the Torobiru River, creating pressure on the Japanese lines and disrupting their defensive operations. On May 20, following a powerful air and artillery bombardment, the 24th Battalion finally launched its long-anticipated assault across the Hongorai River. This marked a turning point as they occupied the strategically significant Egan’s Ridge by May 22. Egan’s Ridge offered an elevated position that overlooked the surrounding terrain, making it crucial for controlling movement in the vicinity.
Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion executed a stealthy wide flanking maneuver towards Mayberry’s Crossing, positioning themselves strategically to disrupt Japanese supply lines and communication. On May 21, the Australians moved out once more to cut the Buin Road at Runai, an essential route that facilitated movement and supplies for the Japanese forces. In the following days, the remaining sections of this critical road were secured as the Japanese forces west of the Hari River were forced to retreat, effectively diminishing their operational capabilities in the region. As these operations unfolded, the 2/8th Commando Squadron established a new base on Morokaimoro, positioning themselves for further reconnaissance and engagements. They began patrolling towards Taitai and the Mivo River, both vital points of interest as the Australians sought to gather intelligence on enemy movements.
In the meantime, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed on to capture the Oso Junction by May 27. However, they encountered harassment from night raiding parties and artillery fire, which highlighted the persistent threat of Japanese resistance in this area. On 2nd June the main advance was resumed, the 58th/59th moving forward without opposition through positions which had been "completely devastated by air, artillery and mortars". "Not one enemy was found alive or dead," wrote the battalion diarist, "although a strong smell of death pervaded the whole area." A prisoner taken later in the day said that the air strike had completely demoralised the defenders, and when they heard the tanks approaching they had fled. On the left the 57th/60th reached the Sunin River against slight opposition. On the 3rd and 4th the 58th/59th continued the advance, moving slowly because of the need to disarm an unprecedentedly large number of mines and booby-traps-more than 100 in three days-until they reached the Peperu River. Patrols moving stealthily forward to the Hari and across it found evidence of much confusion, many positions dug but unoccupied, and small groups of Japanese at large. It was decided to attack frontally towards the Hari next day. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion also reached the Sunin River, facing only slight opposition during their advance. On June 6, the 58th/59th Battalion launched an attack towards the Hari River, but despite their efforts, they only managed to gain about 500 yards against strong defensive positions held by the Japanese. The next three days proved challenging as the 58th/59th Battalion, supported by tanks, found their progress impeded by swampy terrain, a road littered with hidden mines, and intermittent shellfire threatening their advance. The combined obstacles of the natural environment and determined enemy resistance severely limited their ability to make significant gains.
In light of the pressing circumstances, Brigadier Hammer made a pivotal decision to send the 58th/59th Battalion on a shallow outflanking march to the north. Their mission was clear: cut the Buin Road several miles east of the Hari River. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion was tasked with thrusting wide to the south, maneuvering around the Ogorata River to intercept the same road near Rusei. After four days of concentrated air and artillery bombardment designed to weaken enemy defenses, the 58th/59th Battalion commenced its operation on June 12. They sent two companies forward to secure a position along the road, located 2,000 yards east of the Hari. This forward position was critical for their strategy to disrupt Japanese supply lines. Two days later, on June 14, these forces continued their advance eastward toward the Ogorata River, while the remainder of the battalion engaged the enemy at the Hari ford, a crucial crossing point. Despite the fierce opposition, the ford was finally secured on June 15, following another extensive bombardment that significantly diminished the Japanese presence along the road west of the Ogorata. This success was instrumental in facilitating further operations in the area.
Concurrently, the 57th/60th Battalion had embarked on their mission on June 11, making slow but steady progress through the challenging, trackless bush. They ultimately found a path leading from Kingori to Rusei, where they began encountering Japanese resistance. Pushing through treacherous swampy terrain and dense bamboo thickets, the Australians reached the Buin Road at Rusei by June 15, successfully coordinating with patrols from the 58th/59th Battalion the following day. In addition to securing Rusei, a robust patrol from the 57th/60th Battalion set out along the northern flank to establish a patrol base north of Musaraka. This base detected a significant enemy presence behind them, leading to a critical reassessment of their positions. Consequently, in late June, the 24th Battalion was dispatched to take over the Taitai-Kingori-Katsuwa area, reinforcing the Australian foothold and securing vital routes in the region. Meanwhile, back to the south, the 57th/60th Battalion began to push eastward toward the Mobiai River on June 16. However, their advance quickly met strong opposition just 400 yards into enemy territory. Faced with determined resistance, the battalion executed a wide outflanking maneuver, a tactical shift that successfully forced the Japanese forces to withdraw by June 19, allowing the Australians to continue their advance.
In the following days, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed steadily forward, ultimately encountering increased opposition near the Mobiai River on June 24. A heavy bombardment was launched in an attempt to dislodge the entrenched Japanese forces, but it proved ineffective. However, the next day, the Japanese troops had mysteriously withdrawn, allowing the Australians to secure a vital crossing over the river. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the 58th/59th Battalion moved in to occupy the newly attained Mobiai positions. Meanwhile, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions advanced farther north, preparing for an outflanking maneuver aimed at Shishigatero, a critical tactical point lying to the northeast. In anticipation of an Australian offensive, General Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to establish a defensive base near the Mivo ford. This strategic relocation was part of his preparations for the final defenses behind the Mivo River, as Japanese troops sought to hold their ground against the advancing Australians.
By June 28, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions reached their designated assembly areas, where they successfully repelled several Japanese counterattacks. The next morning, they began their advance southeast, shrouded in the loud thunder of artillery barrages that paved the way for their push. They reached the Buin Road at the confluence of the Ivana, Koopani, and Mivo Rivers, making significant headway. At the same time, the 58th/59th Battalion aimed to open the road for the 24th Battalion, positioned about 1,000 yards away. However, they encountered sharp resistance from Japanese forces defending their positions fiercely. Following this notable success, as Hammer’s units faced and repelled various Japanese counterattacks at their new positions, General Bridgeford directed Brigadier Noel Simpson’s 29th Brigade to the frontline to relieve the beleaguered 15th Brigade. Each incoming battalion was met with sharp clashes as they moved up, as Japanese forces sought to maintain their hold on strategic territory. Finally, on July 10, Hammer’s units were relieved, a long-awaited reprieve after weeks of grueling combat. Despite the shift in command, Simpson’s battalions began sending patrols forward in preparation for a crossing of the Mivo River. Unfortunately, due to the heavy resistance encountered and the onset of relentless rains that would continue throughout the month, this final offensive was never carried out. Instead, the troops were limited to vigorous patrolling activities during July and August, maintaining a presence but unable to launch significant offensives in the harsh conditions.
Many of these patrols encountered fierce opposition, signaling that the enemy intended to mount a determined defense along the Mivo line. These patrols regularly captured crucial documents from Japanese soldiers ambushed along the tracks leading to their forward positions, allowing Australian forces to construct a clearer picture of the enemy’s intentions and deployments. Among these daring reconnaissance missions was one conducted by a patrol from the 42nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Oldfield. Tasked with scouting a potential crossing at the Mivo, Oldfield and four other soldiers discovered the river was in flood. Undeterred, they stripped off their gear, swam across the turbulent waters, and advanced 500 yards beyond the riverbank, without any weapons.
The weight of the Australian artillery and mortar bombardments altered the enemy’s tactics. Rather than holding fixed positions, the Japanese began to dig in less and instead employed a strategy of hit-and-run raids and ambushes executed by small groups of three to ten men. Before July 10 arrived, the relentless rain compelled a second postponement of the advance; the new date for the operation was set for July 24. However, the downpour continued to intensify. By July 10, even the patrols could not cross the flooded Mivo. "Torrential rain flooded the divisional area, reducing the Buin Road to a treacherous sea of mud and creating a series of islands between the various rivers." On July 17, conditions worsened further, with a dramatic eight inches of rain falling in just 36 hours. The new challenge was no longer about advancing troops but ensuring that the men were fed where they remained. Virtually all the bridges along the lines of communication were washed away, and all the rivers were flooded; the Mivo was now surging at a speed of twelve miles an hour. As a result, the forward units could only be supplied via air transport. It would take weeks to repair the damaged roads and bridges, leading to D-day being postponed until late August.
As the southern operations unfolded, General Savige made a strategic decision to bring Brigadier Arnold Potts’ 23rd Brigade from Munda and its surrounding islands to Torokina. Upon arrival, Savige immediately tasked the 27th Battalion with taking over the central sector beyond Pearl Ridge. The Australians quickly began bombing and launching attacks in the Berry's Hill-Hunt's Hill area, ultimately securing this crucial location on May 16. Following the seizure of Berry's Hill, the 27th Battalion conducted patrols toward key positions at Sisivie, Tokua, Base Point 3, and Wearne’s Hill throughout late May. On June 3, they initiated an attack towards Tiernan’s Spur, making significant progress before being relieved by the 7th Battalion. The 7th Battalion, upon taking over, adopted an aggressive posture, and on June 11, they attacked Tiernan’s Spur, successfully securing the feature this time. Soon after, a combination of reconnaissance and air bombardment set the stage for an assault on Wearne’s Hill on June 16. However, they encountered strong opposition and were unable to seize its crest until June 20.
In parallel operations, a company captured Sisivie without encountering resistance on June 12. Another company was dispatched to establish a forward base in the Wakunai Valley, successfully creating observation posts that overlooked Inus Point and the large Numa Numa Plantation by June 21. After conducting extensive bombardments against remaining Japanese positions, the Australians finally secured the remainder of Wearne's Hill on June 24. Starting June 26, the 7th Battalion began probing towards Centre Hill, which they ultimately found abandoned on July 6. Meanwhile, on July 3, Tokua was occupied as a base for future operations probing north toward Ibu and Buritsiotorara. Artillery and aircraft continued to harass North Hill, which was finally captured on July 13. Just five days later, Cameron’s Hill was also successfully attacked and secured. The 7th Battalion then pressed forward along the main track towards Charlie Creek and McInnes Hill, achieving their objectives by August 8 as the remaining Japanese forces were forced to retire to Numa Numa.
Looking north, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 26th Battalion in early April, following the fall of the Soraken Peninsula. Upon assuming command, Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson immediately directed the 55th/53rd to cross the Nagam River and launch an attack towards Pora Pora, a key strategic location in the region. The battalion pressed on along the main coastal track, but on April 13, they faced an unsuccessful assault against the enemy positioned at McKinnon's Ridge. Meanwhile, a company from the battalion moved through an inland route, encountering no resistance as they advanced to a position just two miles from Pora Pora. Recognizing the resolute enemy defenses along the main track, the Australians initiated a program of heavy artillery bombardment, complemented by flanking maneuvers designed to outmaneuver the entrenched defenders. This relentless strategy began to pay off, eventually forcing the Japanese to retreat on April 21. During this critical period, the unopposed company on the inland track continued to push forward until it was only one mile from Pora Pora.
In the following four days, the 55th/53rd Battalion fought its way into the Pora Pora bottleneck, engaging in fierce combat that successfully expelled the Japanese forces by April 30. With this victory, the Australians were able to continue their advance northward, making rapid gains against a retreating enemy. On May 4, they captured the Ratsua jetty, a vital logistics point that facilitated further operations. Two columns of the 55th/53rd commenced a swift march towards Ruri Bay, while a company from the 26th Battalion successfully seized Torokori Island on May 6. Three days later, as they finally approached Ruri Bay, the Australians successfully repelled an enemy ambush. However, Brigadier Stevenson’s orders were now to halt their advance at the Ratsua-Ruri Bay line and focus on active patrolling extending northward to Tarbut and Tarlena. Despite this directive, the situation became increasingly precarious. The Japanese, bolstered by four small provisional battalions of naval troops under Captain Kato Ekichi, grew aggressive beyond the established line. Daily patrol clashes erupted, with Australian positions and supply lines subjected to constant ambushes.
Recognizing the need for reinforcements, the weary 55th/53rd Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion on May 21. In response, the 26th immediately dispatched two companies to thrust forward in the area south and east of Buoi Plantation. However, these units quickly encountered strong counterattacks, while patrols faced heavy resistance around Siara and Chindawon. As Stevenson's forces found themselves facing a fortified opponent stronger than anticipated, permission was granted to send two companies from the 31st/51st Battalion to take over the western sector on June 3. Despite this reinforcements, the Australians continued to struggle to make meaningful progress northward. After the 26th Battalion had been in the line for three hard weeks its diarist wrote that the campaign had become one of "holding a superior number of enemy by the aggressive action of a tired depleted battalion-companies were no more than half strength and had been in forward areas continuously for four months". The battalion's fighting strength on 3rd June was only 23 officers and 353 other ranks. The constant patrolling, the artillery fire and the raids on jeep trains on tracks well to the rear were wearing down the men's spirits.
In response to the persistent challenges, a strategic decision was made to outmaneuver the Japanese by landing a reinforced company of the 31st/51st Battalion at Porton Plantation, aiming to approach the enemy from the western flank. During the early hours of June 8, the assault force successfully landed unopposed and swiftly established a perimetric defense reaching 150 yards inland. However, the surprised defenders quickly regrouped, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire that effectively thwarted the unloading of heavy weapons, reserve ammunition, and essential supplies. Although supporting artillery fire was effectively directed at the Japanese positions, the Australians soon found themselves pinned down as Captain Kato reinforced the defenses surrounding their perimeter. To complicate matters further, a convoy of Australian supplies and reinforcements attempting to reach the newly established perimeter was successfully repelled by the tenacious defenders during the night.
The next morning, it was decided to withdraw the force late that evening. However, as the Australians prepared for their retreat, the Japanese launched a strong counterattack from three sides. The enemy attacked in relentless waves, and although they were met with devastating Australian fire, the pressure forced the company to pull back towards the beach. In the morning they launched what was evidently intended as a final blow, thrusting from three sides. Now estimated at over 400 they attacked in waves and were mowed down by the Australian fire. To confuse their enemy they shouted English phrases such as "Watch the right flank", "Throw it in the middle", "It's only me, Jack", and so on. The Australians pulled back towards the beach and at 1 p.m.
During the afternoon, three landing craft moved towards the beach under heavy enemy fire in an effort to embark the soldiers. Unfortunately, two of the crafts were overloaded and became stranded. One eventually drifted off with the tide during the evening; however, the other remained besieged by heavy fire throughout the night. On June 10, Australian forces continued their attempts to rescue the stranded men, launching efforts under the cover of a strong air attack. At dawn on June 10, there were 38 living men on board the besieged landing craft, commanded by Corporal Hall. Their meager arsenal included two Bren guns, five Owen submachine guns, and nine rifles. The remaining rations consisted of eight tins of fruit or vegetables, three or four tins of meat, and three tins of condensed milk. Corporal Hall devised a defensive plan to maximize their chances of survival. He removed the wooden shelves under the overlapping sides of the ALCA to create protective cover under the flaps for all the troops. The dismantled wireless set was discarded overboard to free up additional space. To assist with breathing during rising tides, each man was issued six-inch lengths of copper piping. A continuous watch was kept from the coxswain’s enclosure to monitor Japanese movements and report any developments. The soldiers cleaned and oiled their weapons using lubricant sourced from the engines, ensuring that they were well-maintained and ready for use. A medical kit was placed in the capable hands of a member of the 19th Australian Field Ambulance, who diligently distributed morphine and dressings as needed. At 15:30 on June 10, a concerted effort to rescue the stranded survivors commenced. An intense and precise air attack targeted the enemy positions, but unfortunately, it failed to hit the pillbox from which most of the fire directed at the barge was originating. Bombers dropped inflated rubber rafts near the landing craft in an attempt to assist, but Japanese gunfire prevented any men from reaching these lifelines. Under the cover of an artillery smoke screen, a landing craft attempted to reach the shore. However, enemy fire wounded several crew members, including the coxswain, damaging the steering gear and causing the craft to circle out of control. Amidst this chaos, Corporal Hall attempted to silence the pillbox with a Bren gun, but his efforts were in vain. In a desperate bid to assist the aircraft in locating the target, he splashed bullets towards the pillbox, yet the attempt proved futile as the damaged landing craft was forced to withdraw.
They successfully repelled several Japanese parties attempting to swim out to the immobilized craft during the night. Finally, in the early hours of June 11, the besieged Australians were rescued by three assault boats, managing to pull them from the critical situation. In this endeavor, the Australian forces suffered significant losses, with 23 men reported killed or missing and 106 wounded. Among these casualties, five killed and seven wounded belonged to the 42nd Landing Craft Company. Estimates suggest that the Japanese forces faced losses of approximately 147 confirmed dead, with an additional 50 likely killed. The infantry units suffered specifically dire consequences, with two officers killed and three wounded, these included both company commanders, leaving only Lieutenants Patterson and Reiter, two young veterans from the 6th Division, as the sole surviving leaders from six platoon commanders. Additionally, 14 other ranks were reported killed or missing, while 57 were wounded. Of those wounded, five were sent to the field ambulance suffering from exposure, and nine sustained cuts and bruises. The repulse of the Australian attempt to land near Porton on June 8, 9, and 10 significantly boosted Japanese morale. Observers reported that the landing occurred on a rough strip of beach, making it difficult for the enemy to negotiate the surrounding reefs. The high ground in the vicinity provided an excellent vantage point for the Japanese, allowing for optimal placement of automatic weapons. In response to the Australian advance, Captain Kato swiftly dispatched 150 troops from Chabai to reinforce the approximately 100 men already engaged in combat. These reinforcements succeeded in thwarting any further enemy landings, ultimately pushing the Australians back to the beach, from where their remaining forces were evacuated in haste. Kato estimated that around 250 Australians had landed, resulting in the loss of 60 killed and 100 wounded, alongside 26 Japanese fatalities. If the Japanese report regarding their own losses is accurate, it suggests that both sides engaged in this grim action sustained approximately equal losses. Moreover, during this battle, the reinforced 26th Battalion failed to exploit this diversionary attack, missing the opportunity to push against the stubborn resistance of Captain Kato’s isolated posts. On June 20, Brigadier Potts’ 23rd Brigade began taking over the northern sector, with orders to contain the Japanese forces in the Bonis Peninsula and patrol towards Buka Passage. This relief operation was completed by the end of the month. However, the 8th and 27th Battalions continued to face harassment from Kato’s deep patrols throughout July. Ultimately, the overextended 27th Battalion on the right flank was withdrawn on July 22 to allow the 8th Battalion to successfully attack and capture Commo Ridge the following day.
On July 24, the 8th Battalion launched an unsuccessful attack on Part Ridge. However, this heavy assault shook the defenders, paving the way for the Australians to capture the ridge against light opposition on August 5. This marked the last major action of the Bougainville Campaign. In total, Savige’s 2nd Corps endured losses of 516 Australians killed and 1,572 wounded. It is estimated that approximately 8,500 Japanese soldiers were killed by Australian forces and their native allies, while an additional 9,800 succumbed to illness during the Australian period on Bougainville. By the end of the campaign, only 23,571 men remained out of about 65,000 who had been on the island when the Americans launched their attack in November 1943. Now, attention turned westward to Balikpapan, where General Milford’s 7th Australian Division successfully landed on July 1. They secured an important perimeter extending through Santosa Hill, Parramatta, Mount Malang, and Stalkudo. The battle resumed the following day, with the 2/14th Battalion advancing along the Vasey Highway to seize the Sepinggang airstrip unopposed. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Commando Squadron took over the area northeast of Stalkudo, though they made little progress toward the Lady Schofield feature due to heavy enemy fire. The 2/27th Battalion strengthened and extended its hold on the high ground northwest of Stalkudo. The 2/16th Battalion pressed northward, successfully capturing Resort, Owen, and Oxley without sustaining any losses. The 2/12th Battalion took Potts and consolidated its position on Portee. The 2/10th Battalion conducted mopping-up operations in the secured areas, patrolling vigorously forward, and also seized Mount Sepuluh. Lastly, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by a troop of tanks, cleared Kandasan town along the coast as far as Signal Hill. By the end of the day, Brigadier Eather’s 25th Brigade had landed to take over the central portions of the front, tasked with pushing inland astride the Milford Highway.
On July 3, one company of the 2/10th Battalion advanced through the port, while another cleared the Tank Plateau, and a third focused on the lower ground between the plateau and Parramatta. Concurrently, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by its troop of tanks, successfully took the Santosa barracks, which they had bypassed the previous day. The division now held a bridgehead approximately five miles wide and one mile deep, successfully securing one of the two airstrips. On July 3, light aircraft began operating from this newly established base. However, unloading heavy equipment and stores proved to be a challenging task, causing considerable anxiety among the troops. A swell made it difficult to transfer loads to Landing Craft Tank (LCTs) and small craft, while it was impossible to run the Landing Ship Tank (LSTs) directly onto the beach. By 06:00 on July 3, progress was evident, with 985 vehicles and 1,932 tons of various equipment and stores successfully landed, alongside 16,950 men ashore. Later that morning, an LST began unloading at a pontoon jetty constructed on Green Beach by an American naval construction battalion. The captured port was a scene of devastation, characterized by wrecked workshops and warehouses, leaving little more than twisted, rusty steel and piles of rubble where houses once stood. The seven wharves designed for ocean-going vessels had all been burned, rendering them unusable. Among the debris, one dump of scrap iron collected by the Japanese from the ruins measured 520 yards long, with another scrap pile opposite it stretching about 150 yards.
As unloading operations continued on the main beaches, the 2/14th Battalion began moving towards the Manggar airstrip but found themselves halted at Batakan Kechil. The 2/27th Battalion took over the defense of the Sepinggang strip, and the 2/3rd Commando Squadron discovered the Lady Schofield feature abandoned, allowing their patrols to press on more than a mile across the high ground overlooking the Sepinggang River. Meanwhile, the 2/33rd Battalion encountered heavy opposition in the hills above Chilton Road but managed to capture Opus, Operator, and Oxygen, as well as a height to the northeast named Orange. The 2/31st Battalion advanced along Milford Highway, facing increasing opposition, but they rapidly secured the junction with Chilton Road. However, they were unable to capture the strong enemy defenses at Nobody and Nurse. The 2/12th Battalion began a march towards Pandansari but had to assault Nail to eliminate the threat of enemy harassing fire. The following day, while the 2/33rd Battalion occupied Letter and Lewis, the 2/31st found Nobody and Nurse abandoned, allowing them to easily secure these features. One company also took control of Nail and began probing towards Lodge. At the same time, the 2/14th Battalion resumed its advance towards Manggar. They successfully crossed the river and pushed 1,300 yards across the airstrip without facing any opposition. However, after midday, heavy Japanese fire unexpectedly swept across the airfield, resulting in the deaths of several officers at the control tower. Despite this setback, and aided by the fire from destroyer Eaton, the Australians pressed on and ultimately secured Manggar and its airfield.
By the end of the day, General Milford had successfully pushed the enemy out of Balikpapan and further secured the Sepinggang and Manggar strips. However, it became clear that Admiral Kamada was attempting to withdraw the remnants of his force to the Batuchampar area, aiming to delay any advance along the Milford Highway for as long as possible. The 454th Independent Battalion continued to hold the commanding terrain north of Manggar, and on July 5, its defenses came under intense naval, air, and artillery bombardment, which initially failed to silence the Japanese guns. Meanwhile, Brigadier Eather pressed his advance north in the center. The 2/25th Battalion took control of the positions at Nurse and Nail, while the 2/33rd pressed on against dwindling opposition to capture Mackay, Marshall, Mutual, and Margin. The 2/31st Battalion moved forward to seize Letter and Lewis, followed by the capture of Laverton and Liverpool. Recognizing the necessity of securing the western side of Balikpapan Bay to facilitate port operations, Milford ordered Brigadier Chilton’s 18th Brigade to land the reinforced 2/9th Battalion at Penadjam. Following a naval and artillery bombardment, the landing was executed unopposed during the afternoon of July 5, with patrols of the 2/9th immediately probing north and south to secure the perimeter. The following day, a patrol moved south toward Nanang village and onward to the Sesumpu River, while other units explored the area towards the Riko River and Separi. On July 6, the 2/33rd Battalion successfully attacked and captured Metal and Muffle, but they were ultimately repelled from Judge. Meanwhile, the 2/25th pressed onward, taking control of Liverpool and occupying Huon.
Looking southeast, the 2/14th Battalion began to probe enemy positions on this day. A strong patrol successfully captured Waites’ Knoll but had to repel a series of strong counterattacks during the night, while another patrol was forced back along Vasey Highway. Over the next few days, the Australians continued to engage, probing and bombarding the commanding enemy positions. Ultimately, the 2/14th launched an attack and captured the Frost and Brown features on July 9, effectively eliminating the enemy threat in that area. Meanwhile, the 2/16th Battalion and the 2/5th Commando Squadron attacked an enemy concentration at Gate on July 6 and secured the position two days later, further solidifying their hold on Grand by July 9. To the northwest, on July 7, the 2/25th Battalion moved to Cult and then attempted an assault on Jam but was repelled by fierce defenders. The following day, while Jam underwent probing and bombardment, the 2/33rd Battalion discovered Justice abandoned after heavy shelling and pressed on toward Joint and Judge. Concurrently, Brigadier Eather had dispatched the 2/6th Commando Squadron into the hills overlooking the Sumber River. They successfully occupied Job on July 8 and seized Freight the following day. By July 9, after a concentrated artillery barrage, Jam, Joint, and Judge finally fell as the 25th Brigade secured the first stretch of the Milford Highway to Batuchampar. The 2/31st Battalion then advanced to a road bend due north of Junior, where they encountered an ambush by Japanese raiders. Meanwhile, a company of the 2/9th Battalion landed unopposed at Djinabora on the afternoon of July 8, and on the following day, a patrol base was established at Teloktebang.
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General Hammer launched a fierce campaign across Bougainville, battling entrenched Japanese troops, they secured the strategic Soraken Peninsula and advanced toward the vital Hongorai River. By July, they had reached the Hari River, significantly weakening Japanese defenses. However, relentless rain hindered further operations.
